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ABSTRACT: Dialogues and collaborations between scientists and non-
scientists are now widely understood as important elements of sci-
entific research and public engagement with science. In recognition 
of this, the authors, a neuroscientist and a poet, use a dialogical ap-
proach to extend questions and ideas first shared during a lab-based 
poetry residency. They recorded a conversation and then expanded it 
into an essayistic form, allowing divergent disciplinary understand-
ings and uses of experiment, noise, voice and emotion to be articu-
lated, shared and questioned.
Experiment
JW: Shall we start by talking about what experiment means in each 
of our fields?1 I think about experiment as a process of trying things 
out, and so when I say I write “experimental poetry” what I gener-
ally mean is that the outcome isn’t determined in advance, and I’m 
prepared for things to go wrong. 
To our minds this is related to the idea of the essay itself, especially 
in its obsolete sense, equivalent to assay, meaning to test or trial. Iain 
1. For discussion of the significance of dialogues and collaborations between scientists 
and non-scientists as elements of scientific research and public engagement with sci-
ence, see Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott, and Michael Gibbons, Re-Thinking Science: Knowl-
edge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); Louise 
Phillips, “Analysing the Dialogic Turn in the Communication of Research-Based 
Knowledge: An Exploration of the Tensions in Collaborative Research,” Public Under-
standing of Science 20:1 (2011): 80–100. 
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Biggs, among many others, has excavated the deeper roots of the word 
in the Latin exagium, a weighing: 2 at this etymological depth one can 
feel the tug of the emergence of inductive method, of a process of weigh-
ing up probabilities rather than deducing knowledge from premises 
(even if for Francis Bacon himself, the essay form was, in Lisa Jardine’s 
words, simply a way of “projecting . . . precepts in an appealing and 
readily acceptable form.”3)
What you are reading now is a particular kind of essay: one that 
takes its lead from Joan Retallack, who proposes poetic experiment as 
“conversation with an interrogative dynamic,”4 and Brian Dillon, who 
advises that academic essays “become essays at the moment they aspire 
to be other than academic, when they sideline rigor for the pleasures 
of seduction and surprise.”5 This is a piece that takes as its skeleton a 
recorded conversation we had in late 2013, which we have then larded 
with commentary wherever the pressure to digress or interrogate became 
overwhelming. We are unsure what shape the resulting creature has, but 
we hope its contours are at least interesting.
I’m often looking to try something that I haven’t done before, and 
I’m prepared to see what comes out of a process of making where 
the end product isn’t determined in advance but emerges from that 
process.
SS: I suppose experiment to me has a similar sense, in that science 
is our way of finding out about the world. And within that there 
are two broad ways of doing science; you can do an observational 
study, where you have something that you observe, and you make 
that observation scientific by being formal about your observation 
processes, and trying to be “objective” in how you do this. On the 
other hand you have an experiment, where you take a situation and 
you manipulate that situation, and see what the effects of your ma-
nipulation are, to put it crudely. With either of these, experiments or 
observational studies, you’re trying to find something out, and you 
don’t know what the outcome is going to be. You might have a good 
2. Iain Biggs, “Essaying Place: Landscape, Music, and Memory,” in Process: Landscape 
and Text, ed. Catherine Brace and Adeline Johns-Putra (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 
pp. 149–171, reference to p. 155.
3. Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974), p. 228.
4. Joan Retallack, “What is Experimental Poetry & Why Do We Need It?,” Jacket 32, 
April 2007, http://jacketmagazine.com/32/p-retallack.shtml.
5. Brian Dillon, “Energy and Rue: An Essay on Essays,” in Objects in This Mirror: Essays 
(Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2014), pp. 349–359, quote on p. 349.
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idea about which way it’s going to go, but that’s not necessarily go-
ing to be right; and there might not be any effect at all. 
If I was going to give you an emotional map, experiment is a 
positive, exciting word for me. It’s got the connotation that there’s 
going to be data to look at, and I can honestly say that I’ve never 
stopped finding data interesting. No matter what’s happened in the 
experiment—how many rows there have been over the construction, 
how badly you think parts of it have been run—when you get some 
data to look at you get a bit excited. Here’s something we can look 
at, and there’s something it will tell me once I can interrogate it in 
the right way. 
JW: I like the distinction you draw between the construction of 
the experiment and the data, because in poetry it’s different: those 
things are actually joined together. You don’t present results from 
your experiment; the results are the experiment in a sense. There’s 
not that same separation. So for example, with the work I was doing 
based on the anechoic chamber, I processed the recordings that I’d 
made in there to make new poems, but that’s different from saying, 
“OK, this is my data, now how can I interpret that.”
In June 2012, Sophie took James into UCL’s anechoic chamber, a room 
designed to block out external sounds and to absorb any noises made 
inside it, making it one of the quietest places in the world. Aware of John 
Cage’s experiences in Harvard’s anechoic chamber,6 he came expecting 
to hear something, but was surprised by the rich ecology of sounds that 
presented themselves as he sat alone in the room with the lights out. 
In a recording in which he tries to describe as closely as possible the 
sounds he could hear, he talks about twittering birdcalls, a wet crackling 
sound, and a sense of dull pressure that he seems to have experienced 
as auditory. This recording then became the basis for a series of poems 
called “Describing Silence: Six Distortions,” in which he progressively 
distorted these words through a variety of chance and subjective proce-
dures, each distortion being in a sense a mishearing of the last, a way 
of returning echo or reverb to the driest of recordings. 
And so the kind of knowledge that’s produced out of that is an ex-
periential one; anything that people find out about the possibilities 
for literature or for lived experience is known in the performance, or 
the hearing, or the reading of the poetry. I think that’s true for certain 
kinds of poetry, at any rate. So the kind of knowledge that comes out 
6. John Cage, “Experimental Music,” in Silence: Lectures and Writings (London: Calder 
and Boyers, 1968), pp. 7–12, reference to p. 8. 
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of that is different: there’s not the same emphasis on replicability. I 
mean, why would you want to replicate a poem? 
With complacent ignorance, James has asked a very good question. 
There could be several answers to this. A famous one comes from 
Borges, whose character Pierre Menard, a twentieth-century “symbolist 
from Nîmes” rewrote, word for word, a few chapters of Don Quixote.7 
This is neither transcription, claims Borges’s narrator, nor copying: in-
stead, we might think of it as a mirroring or doubling through willed 
coincidence. Such a doubling is impossible, though, and not only as a 
matter of practical effort. Where Cervantes writes a “mere rhetorical 
eulogy of history,” Menard proposes an idea that the narrator judges 
“astounding” coming from “a contemporary of William James,” by 
writing exactly the same words.8 The act of duplication, in its produc-
tive futility, is utopian: Menard writes, in a letter to the narrator, that 
“every man should be capable of all ideas, and I believe that in the 
future he will be.”9
The significance of framing and the importance of context in the gen-
eration of meaning have since become critical commonplaces, though 
proponents of conceptual poetry have recently restated the arguments 
for replication. Notwithstanding the bombast with which some of these 
claims are made, one good argument for replicating a poem is to exploit 
the possibilities of writing in the age of the database. As Craig Dworkin 
has put it, conceptual poetry “often operates as an interface—returning 
the answer to a particular query; assembling, rearranging and display-
ing information; or sorting and selecting from files of accumulated lan- 
guage.”10 This therefore speaks of a desire among poets to be up-to-date, 
which may be terribly melancholy (and nowhere more so than in the 
fact that this idiomatic expression is itself hopelessly old, having first 
entered the language in the 1890s), but is not in itself unpraiseworthy. 
Though maybe there’s a parallel in your work—perhaps replicating 
an experiment is necessary but not as exciting?
 SS: It is necessary, and I think the most important replication is 
7. Jorge Luis Borges, “Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote,” in Fictions, trans. An-
thony Bonner, ed. Anthony Kerrigan (London: John Calder, 1985), pp. 42–51, quote on 
p. 47.
8. Ibid., p. 49.
9. Ibid., p. 51.
10. Craig Dworkin, “The Fate of Echo,” in Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual 
Writing, ed. Craig Dworkin and Kenneth Goldsmith (Evanston, IL: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 2011), xxiii–liv, quote on p. xlii.
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when somebody else replicates it. We’ve just done a big study trying 
to replicate an effect that somebody else has published quite a few 
papers on; it’s all come from one lab, and we cannot replicate it.
Sophie ran a study to replicate someone else’s original finding; namely, 
that people with training in music are better at listening to speech in 
noisy environments than those without musical training.11 This is a 
potentially fascinating and important result, and she planned take the 
task into a brain scanner to look at the neural basis for the effect, hop-
ing to find how musicians’ brain responses might differ. In brief, she has 
not gone into the scanner yet, as she could not reproduce the original 
results. She found other effects—for example, musicians are better than 
non-musicians at discriminating small differences in pitch—so she is 
pretty sure that she has not simply run a poor study, but the expected ef-
fect has boiled down to a more prosaic explanation (people with higher 
IQs do better at listening to speech in noise). This is interesting, and 
she has written it up in the context of the original research,12 but if she 
were perfectly honest, it would have been great if the effect had been 
replicable and she could have gone on to look at the brain results. 
There is a great argument going on at the moment in the social 
sciences about a supposed “replication crisis,” with a few high-profile 
results in social psychology proving to be hard to replicate, or conjec-
tured to possibly result from unconscious biases in the experimenters.13 
However it would be a mistake to assume that this is unusual: the 
process of science is predicated on the assumption that we make sci-
entific progress by building and developing on past work and previous 
interpretations. Part of this process is the refinement and improvement 
of scientific methods, and this is a process that often involves either 
overturning or reframing previous studies’ results. 
Replications of experiments, and failures to replicate, sound a bit 
boring, and it is boring, in some ways, but also essential, and also 
fascinating. It’s as much part of science as a new experiment. It’s 
never an end, a failure to replicate; it opens more doors, it asks more 
questions.
11. Alexandra Parbery-Clark, Erika Skoe, Carrie Lam, and Nina Kraus, “Musician En-
hancement for Speech-in-Noise,” Ear and Hearing 30:6 (2009): 653–661.
12. Dana Boebinger et al., “Musicians and Non-Musicians Are Equally Adept at Perceiv-
ing Masked Speech,” Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 137:1 (2015): 378–387.
13. See the special issue of Social Psychology, 45:3 (2014); and Uta Frith and Chris Frith, 
“A Question of Trust: Fixing the Replication Crisis,” Guardian, May 28, 2014, http://
www.theguardian.com/science/occams-corner/2014/may/28/question-trust-fixing 
-replication-crisis-experimenter-reputation.
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I think there’s a belief around that if you can just get everything 
right, you can do a perfect experiment, and then you’ve got the last 
word on something. And that’s not it: it’s a process, and a hundred 
years from now, it would be very interesting to see whether the work 
that’s going on at the moment in neuroscience and psychology will 
still be discussed in the scientific framework at all. And we have no 
control over that; all we can do is do the best we can with what 
we’ve got. You never reach an end point; you’re never right—you’re 
just less wrong. Many other factors drive and structure scientific ca-
reers—getting funding, getting published, getting promoted. But at 
the heart you’re still asking questions about the world and trying to 
answer them—it’s about the pleasure of finding things out, as Feyn-
man put it.
 JW: One of the things I really like is that when you start speak-
ing to scientists, almost as soon as you start speaking to them, you 
realize that there’s this sort of reflexivity within science, which is 
something that’s perhaps occluded in popular perceptions of science 
as something which proceeds by a kind of ever-more accurate cleav-
ing to a point of truth, even if it never reaches it. Anyway that’s one 
position within the philosophy of science, but actually there’s this 
kind of recursiveness in the sense that you’re always referring to or 
working with elements from the history of your field.
James was hand waving here to the realist position, even though scien-
tific realists might focus their arguments less on truth than on “novel 
predictive success”: the extent to which a theory (or parts thereof) might 
make successful predictions of facts beyond those used to construct it.14 
Peter Vickers has assembled and discussed twenty historical examples 
in which rejected scientific theories produced novel predictive success, 
in a paper that tries to refine the realist position.15 One interesting case 
is that of the eighteenth-century instrument makers who successfully 
made achromatic telescopes by combining two different lenses made 
of different kinds of glass, based on a false analogy with the supposed 
refractive properties of the lens and the humor of the human eye.16 In 
fact, as Vickers notes, the human eye suffers from exactly the kinds of 
“chromatic aberration” as early telescopes, which is only corrected in 
14. Alan Musgrave, Essays on Realism and Rationalism (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), 
p. 56. 
15. Peter Vickers, “A Confrontation of Convergent Realism,” Philosophy of Science 80:2 
(2013): 189–211.
16. Ibid., 198–201.
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the brain.17 Vickers derives a point from this concerning the difficulties 
of deciding which parts of a theory are involved in making a predic-
tion; but for us, the interest comes in contemplating the ambiguous 
relationship between a system of knowledge, later abandoned, and its 
dependent but surviving invention. The usefulness of the false analogy, 
the train of thought that rattles loose enough to jump tracks, or the leap 
of connection that misfires but lands somewhere hospitable.
Which is perhaps an obvious thing to say—it would be impossible 
to think of any field of understanding which doesn’t do that—but 
that sense of circularity or circulation shows the extent to which sci-
ence is a cultural activity. And it made me think of the relationship 
between poetry and criticism; when you’re talking about replica-
tion and the relationship between two lab groups, it made me think 
of two critics interpreting a work and each trying to offer a more 
convincing interpretation. And if you’re a poet and a critic—even if 
that’s a critic in an amateur sense—you’re reading people’s work in 
a critical way, because you’re trying to work out what they’re doing, 
and you’re trying to see if the effects that they produce are also ones 
that you understand.
 SS: A paper’s just come out saying there’s this whole literature on 
visual imagery, and there’s a whole other literature on visual work-
ing memory, and everything about them is different; they use differ-
ent experiments, they publish in different journals, there’s no cross 
talk—and are they one and the same thing? And it looks like they 
probably are, actually: they’ve just been called different things, but 
the phenomena both literatures have been addressing are the same. 
And that’s something that can happen entirely because of the factors 
that have kept the literatures apart. These factors probably include, 
at the individual level, a kind of silo mentality about only finding 
out about work that seems relevant to what one is doing oneself, and 
not reading more widely, as much as it’s a wider issue around differ-
ent research traditions and different research communities. But if 
you take a step back, that’s a positive development in the literature; 
now people are starting to address the two in the same framework. 
And one of the things I’m slowly coming to realize about science, 
and this is probably true of other fields of human endeavor, is that 
the rate at which there is progression is not measured in the same 
units as scientific careers. So any one window that you get over your 
life in science, you won’t see—it’s a bit like evolution, invisible over 
your lifespan, but there is change going on. By progress, I don’t mean 
17. Ibid., 200.
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some idealized, linear improvement in how people think; I just mean 
change in how they frame and approach questions.
 JW: In some ways we do in literature think in much longer 
time-scales: think about translations of classical authors, which are 
continually being remade. And the way the classic is treated is very 
interesting, because poets in a sense are undoing as much as trans-
lating these works; the question is how do you make these works 
contemporary, and often it’s by a complete travesty of the original.
A travesty might be no more than a change of clothing, though you 
would not guess this from the accreted fears of grotesquery, debase-
ment, and sexual impropriety that have grown around the word. Two 
of James’s favorite classical works reupholstered for the twenty-first 
century start like this: “We begin in the dark and birth is the death of 
us / Who said that? / Hegel / Sounds more like Beckett” (Anne Carson 
covering Sophocles), and “the innumerable years / full of nobbers” (Tim 
Atkins covering Horace).18 
On translation as “undoing”: Clive Scott bases his “centrifugal” 
practice of translation on the idea “that the text is constantly in search 
of itself; that it does not comprehend itself; that it has yet to fulfil 
itself.”19 This frees the translator from a fear that the source text is in 
need of protection, or else that contains an ultimate authority; it really 
was like that when we found it.
Scott also grounds this mode of translation historically, pegging its 
synesthetic tendencies to the “advent of abstraction” around 1912: an 
artistic development that “facilitates unhindered passage between the 
senses.”20 The importance of abstraction is certainly familiar to a prac-
tice of science that depends on the fungibility of information, its ability 
to be transformed without loss or slippage across different modes of rep-
resentation (from mathematical to visual, for example). But Scott also 
proposes translation as a way of “outwitting . . . the alphabet” and its 
impoverished representational structures;21 translation here is not about 
the conservation of essential features but a way of making a text “[fan] 
out into multiple versions of itself.”22 
18. Sophokles, Antigonick, trans. Anne Carson (Tarset, Northumberland: Bloodaxe 
Books, 2012), n.p.; Tim Atkins, “Horace,” in Horace (Oakland, CA: O Books, 2007), p. 1.
19. Clive Scott, “From the Intermedial to the Synaesthetic: Literary Translation as Cen-
trifugal Practice,” Comparative Critical Studies 8:1 (2011): 39–59, quote on p. 40.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., 51.
22. Ibid., 40.
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But in a sense there is an abridgement of huge amounts of time, 
which you as a scientist would possibly not make—I mean you 
wouldn’t necessarily look back to Aristotelian ideas, or an early mod-
ern natural philosopher—or would you? 
 SS: Occasionally you encounter people who do, but you tend not 
to; the narrative around neuroscience is on moving forward, and I 
think that can take our attention away from what has come before, 
at our own risk. There’s a really good book by Willem Levelt about 
the history of psycholinguistics, pointing out that people have been 
doing psychological and scientific investigations of human language 
for centuries—and actually, a lot of the ideas that were around at 
the start have not changed very much.23 The methodologies change, 
and the tools you have available change—but we forget as much 
as we accrete. And these remain stories: I think humans are terrors 
for telling stories about something and then forgetting that that’s a 
version. It hardens into truth. If you look at Paul Broca, who in the 
accepted story was one of the first people to relate human language 
to a bit of the brain, it turns out loads of other people were saying the 
same thing—in particular Max Dax, who sounds like someone from 
Dr. Seuss. As Broca was the more high-status person, it stuck to him, 
and it’s still called Broca’s Area. Another example from Levelt’s book 
is the idea of box-and-arrow model building: we think of people 
drawing box-and-arrow models as being symptomatic of psychol-
ogy in the 1980s; but you go back 100 years and they were called 
“diagram-makers,” and they were everywhere. So I think there’s a 
short-sightedness that can hurt science, although that’s perhaps how 
it has to be.
 JW: When you’re stuck with a problem, to what extent do you go 
back?
 SS: Pretty often, actually. If an experiment has gone horribly 
wrong, and you have a result that you didn’t expect but it’s a real 
result, then there’s going to be something out there that will tell you 
something about why it’s happened. And one of the things I enjoy 
doing is trying to trace back the ideas—I’ve always been concerned 
about people who have spent their lives doing one experimental 
paradigm, and I’ve always found that a terrifying thought, that you 
might spend your life doing one thing. I’ve always tried to do—some 
people would say not in a good way—too many different things. 
But to me, I don’t think you’ll understand the sorts of things I’m 
interested in just by doing one sort of experiment. So I actively enjoy 
23. Willem Levelt, A History of Psycholinguistics: The Pre-Chomskyan Era (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012).
05_24.3 wilkes_331-350.indd   339 8/24/16   4:57 PM
340 Configurations
trying to winkle out other studies that might have found something 
different. I wrote a paper with Carolyn last year where we went back 
and reviewed a whole section of studies on a particular idea about 
temporal processing and reframed all the results.24
Sophie is referring to a very popular idea in neuroscience that language 
processing—which is found in the left side of the brain in most adults—
is not lateralized in this way simply because it is language, but because 
human speech has certain structural properties that the left side of the 
brain happens to be really good at processing. This is such a common 
view that until recently it was almost a dogma; its popularity might be 
because it provides a good way to rebut a Chomskyian argument that 
language is unique and special.
However, this idea has been maintained as an intriguing explana-
tion with little to no empirical support. In her review Sophie went back 
to some of the original papers from which this position developed, and 
found that a number of critical terms have changed their meaning al-
most completely over time. For example, the understanding of “tempo-
ral” in the literature has changed since the early ’60s, from referring 
to a task that occurs in time (and thus to the question of which sound 
came first), to the idea that temporality is a characteristic of the sounds 
themselves, through to the idea that “temporal” refers to a sound that 
is short or transient. Science is likely to be full of such examples of 
linguistic drift, creating problems for the accumulation of knowledge.
Noise
JW: I’ve recently been thinking about noise in terms of experiment: 
the artefacts, the results that don’t count as data, the junk of what 
you’re doing. I was talking to a musician recently about junk sound, 
and a genre of music that uses throwaway, garbage noise, and re-
claims that as the basis for music, and I thought that some of the 
work I’ve been doing with you was using the junk of language to 
make poetry. Those elements that in conversations you throw away: 
the tics, the repetitions, the “umms”—which produce a really tex-
tural effect; and it was that texture I was really interested in. And in 
promoting those, if you like, epiphenomena of language to the level 
of signification. So the things where you would normally say, “This 
is not the information; we’re having a conversation but I’m going to 
24. Carolyn McGettigan and Sophie Scott, “Cortical Asymmetries in Speech Perception: 
What’s Wrong, What’s Right and What’s Left?,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16:5 (2012): 
269–276.
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throw away all that extra stuff, all those bits that my conversational 
partner didn’t mean to say, and if I had to transcribe this conversa-
tion, or relate it to someone else, what I’d relay is the message.” 
That’s a sort of informational model if you like; but with the poetry 
I was interested in taking all that stuff—and when you record it you 
do actually have that at your disposal—and then promoting that 
into the work, to say there’s something interesting going on here. 
But how does it work for you? Clearly you’re interested in noise in 
the sense perhaps of the emotion, that’s carried in the timbre of the 
voice? Something that is informational, but if you were to transcribe 
it, would disappear entirely. And how about the noise created by 
experiments? The noisiness of the data from a scanner for example?
 SS: To go back to your conversational example— 
Although Sophie didn’t pick up on James’s introduction of experimental 
or statistical noise, it is an important consideration in her working life. 
Maybe she is taking “noise” literally here because so much of her work 
involves acoustic noise, which she has to think about continually. But, 
like anyone working with data collected from humans, she frequently 
has to deal with the high degree of statistical noise produced through 
intra-individual and inter-individual differences. 
To go back to your conversational example, I’ve been thinking about 
this exact scenario for a couple of review papers, because there’s a 
lot of stuff that we do to enable us to speak together. That partly in-
cludes all these funny little noises, like the “yeah yeah” I was saying 
whilst you were speaking, which is called “back-channelling”—you 
would never remember that, and in fact I was producing it in a way 
that would be very hard to do under voluntary control. But that’s 
just one bit of it: we do all sorts of things to actually make conversa-
tion possible. We coordinate our breathing: you won’t have noticed 
it but we’ll have started to breathe at the same rate; we’ll have started 
to speak at the same rate; we’ll have converged on the pitch of our 
voices. There are all sorts of differences we make to speak together, 
and we throw almost all of that away when we remember the con-
versation, because none of it is to do with the content, and all of it, 
or much of it, is to do with making the conversation possible at all. 
And that’s before you even get into dysfluencies: normally produced 
speech is phenomenally dysfluent. 
 JW: So what do you think the value of that is? That stuff that gets 
chucked away—I think we both share an interest in it. So why is it 
interesting to you? 
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SS: I’m interested because a lot of it is to do with actually managing 
the conversation itself whilst you’re doing it. So if you think about 
the synchronous speech we did together— 
Sophie is referring here to synchronous speech, a task where people are 
asked to speak together. Known as choral speaking, it is common in 
some parts of the world as a competitive performance for schoolchil-
dren; it is also found universally as a part of religious ceremonies, or in 
other situations—such as swearing allegiance or political demonstra-
tions—where people would like to act in a co-ordinated fashion. In the 
same way, all modern armies still train using synchronised marching 
drills, although this has not formed part of warfare for over a century. 
Adults are surprisingly good at synchronous speech—given the same 
text to read aloud they can do so to a very high degree of accuracy, and 
align the rhythm and pitch of their voices to make this possible.25
Reading chorally in a recent performance with two other poets, James 
had a slight but undeniable sense of being between bodies, his attention 
split between the words on the script in front of him, and the two voices 
to his left whose enunciations guided and fitted themselves to his own. 
Though as Denise Riley points out, “there’s nothing new in a notion 
of transpersonal individuality.” She goes on to note that “nineteenth-
century German philosophy is replete with it,” while “Marx’s ‘Theses 
on Feuerbach’ conceived of a de-centred being.”26 
—We had to align a behavior that we don’t normally align with 
somebody else; I mean we do align, but in conversation we usually 
do it antiphonally, so we take turns. And if you look at the charac-
teristics of turn-taking, people never talk over each other. They don’t 
interrupt each other, there aren’t long gaps; the argument is that this 
is because you entrain your behaviour with each other. This enables 
you to do smooth turn-taking, which is an absolute conversational 
universal: anywhere in the world conversations will have this qual-
ity, even if they’re signed. 
Now Sophie is referring to conversational speech, which is governed by 
several universal rules, as observed by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson. 
These include the following: speaker change occurs; one person speaks 
25. Fred Cummins, “Practice and Performance in Speech Produced Synchronously,” 
Journal of Phonetics 31:2 (2003): 139–148.
26. Denise Riley, Time Lived, Without Its Flow (London: Capsule Editions, 2012), p. 78, 
n. xix.
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at a time; simultaneous speech is common but brief; transitions with 
no gap and no overlap are common; neither turn order nor turn size, 
duration or content are fixed; number of talkers can vary; talk can be 
continuous or discontinuous.27 These rules are features of all conversa-
tions that have been investigated to date, in both spoken and signed 
languages. It has been argued that alignments between talkers (such 
as body posture and movement, voice pitch, breath, words, accent, and 
syntax) make this management of conversation possible.
So it’s interesting to me because managing the conversation is ba-
sically a different set of problems you have to solve, which you’re 
doing at the same time as deciding what you want to talk about and 
how you’re going to do it. It’s unbelievably complicated, and they’re 
two largely separate systems. 
JW: I’m interested in poetry as it’s experienced in performance, 
and a performance is a very heavily coded context in which to hear 
another person, especially if you’ve got a couple of performers on 
stage, relating to each other through improvisation perhaps, which 
pushes poetry toward the context of music, improvised music. But 
the kinds of things that are happening to an audience member as 
they experience that are complex, and I don’t quite know how to 
work them back into poetry, except perhaps through an intuitive 
understanding of what it’s like to be experiencing this.
SS: One of the things I find interesting about poetry and other 
forms of performance is how they incorporate all these elements at 
once. What I mean is that in an ordinary conversation, the evidence 
suggests that what we do when we encode information is throw away 
a lot of the surface stuff, and we remember the gist of what went on, 
which is why we don’t remember people repeating themselves. But 
in real time, while you’re really there, that’s experientially very pres-
ent. So if I suddenly began repeating myself, you’d be picking up 
on that, and your immediate understanding would be colored by 
it. And my impression is, a lot of what poets do, particularly when 
they’re writing for performance, is to capture elements of that expe-
rience overtly, and play with all of those things together. It’s not as 
simple as saying, “They’re playing with sounds,” but those elements 
are there in the sound. 
 
27. Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson, “A Simplest Systematics for 
the Organization of Turn-Taking for Conversation,” Language 50:4 (1974): 696–735, 
esp. pp. 700–701.
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Voice
SS: You have a comfortable performing voice, which is almost ex-
actly the same as your normal voice. None of it sounds forced; it 
sounds real, if that makes sense.
JW: I think it does. A couple of years ago I did some work with 
opera singers that was absolutely incredible: when you think about 
opera, you think about artificiality perhaps—and there’s a discourse 
around a sort of “genuineness” that attaches itself to poetry, and 
maybe that’s why my performing voice sounds the way it does—it’s 
part of the field in which I work, in which you wouldn’t orate in the 
same way. 
Although James talks down oration here, he is not above vocal embel-
lishment himself. One of the technologies that Sophie introduced him 
to was Delayed Auditory Feedback, in which one’s own voice is replayed 
through headphones with a slight delay. This produces extreme speech 
dysfluencies in people who do not normally experience them, and in 
recent readings he has been trying to work with this phenomenon, to 
perform through the breathlessness, slurring, tonal changes and stam-
mering that DAF produces. It seems to relate to the claustrophobic his-
tory of scientific enclosure that James has been researching (sparrows 
and titmice suffocated in air pumps, astronauts’ spacesuits failing), and 
to provide a way of pushing this history, so to speak, through the body 
of the performer.
But the reason why opera singing is so interesting is that an opera 
singer is deliberately producing an incredibly artificial sound, but 
the power to express emotion that comes through that is absolutely 
incredible. One of the most amazing things was not hearing them 
on stage but being sat in a practice room, and they’d just get up and 
sing some Lieder or some pieces they’d been learning, at a distance of 
a couple of feet from you, and the emotional charge of that experi-
ence was extraordinary.
SS: It is. Do you know about opera singers’ formants? You know 
you get these spectral prominences in speech, so if I go “aaar,” 
“ooor,” “eeer,” the pitch of my voice is the same, but I’m changing 
the shape of my mouth to change where the formants are, and a lot 
of the “identification,” to put it crudely, of speech sounds depends 
on the formants and how they change. What opera singers do—
what we consider to be opera singing—involves introducing another 
formant. Some people argue that it’s two formants joined together: 
nonetheless it’s different. And it’s not different enough that you 
05_24.3 wilkes_331-350.indd   344 8/24/16   4:57 PM
Wilkes & scott / Poetry and neuroscience 345
can’t tell what they’re saying, but it seems to be a strategy for making 
the voice stand out. So it gives the voice a sort of spectral power, in 
addition to the volume with which they’re producing it. They have 
to sing against an orchestra without microphones so it’s a technique 
they’ve developed to make the voice separate from the other instru-
ments—and coincidentally, from other sung voices. 
So it’s an extraordinary instrument, and the more I work with 
voices, the more I realize speech is just one thing we can do with it. 
The beatboxers we’ve been working with can do ridiculous things! 
They can produce three separate sources of sound at once, and ac-
cording to traditional phonetics that’s not possible, you can only do 
one. We only know this because we took this guy into the anechoic 
chamber and we got a laryngograph on him, so we were measuring 
the sound he was making at his larynx separately from what we were 
recording at his lips. And he’d start a buzzy sound at the larynx, 
and then seamlessly pick it up at the lips, and then produce these 
nasal harmonics, and he’s independently varying them all. So this 
gives you polyphonic music because you’ve got these three different 
voices going on. 
There are several theories about how we evolved our voices, our 
speech,28 but it’s not clear what the evolutionary advantages of some 
of these changes, like the domed roof of the mouth, were before we 
were actually speaking. We don’t really know why we’ve got these 
neat little mouths, which happen to be good for speaking with. It 
could be that the beatboxers and the singers, and all the other things 
you can do with your voice, can tell us more about this. We really 
enjoy expertise and what people can do with their voices—maybe 
that’s what drove it. Kind of like a peacock’s tail.
If you look back at the history of swimming in this country, we 
didn’t have front crawl until relatively recently. We got front crawl 
from the Native Americans: there was a swimming competition in 
the Thames, and the Native Americans won because they did front 
crawl, which was considered to be very inappropriate, and terribly 
wrong and splashy.29 Now I would like to assert that we didn’t evolve 
to do crawl—crawl is just a phenomenally good use of the shape of 
our bodies and the way our arms move. Maybe that’s what speech 
28. E.g., Charles F. Hockett, “The Origin of Speech,” Scientific American 203:3 (1960): 
88–96; Michael C. Corballis, From Hand to Mouth : The Origins of Language (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Philip Lieberman, The Biology and Evolution of 
Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
29. Paul Mason, “Heroes of Swimming: Captain Matthew Webb,” Guardian, October 10, 
2013, http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/the-swimming-blog/2013/oct/10 
/swimming-captain-matthew-webb-swim-the-english-channel.
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is: speech is just an extremely useful way of using what we’ve got 
to express human language, in the same way that our hands didn’t 
evolve to do sign language, but that’s an extremely good use of them 
for communication. Maybe something entirely different has driven 
the evolution of this structure, but because we can talk with it we 
think that’s why we’ve got it.
JW: There’s a variation of that with poetry and voice. Voice in the 
physical sense is obviously the carrier through which a lot of people 
experience poetry; but it has these multiple harmonics of meaning 
in it, and people talk about voice in a way that’s metaphorical as 
soon as you say it. It implies all sorts of things to do with style: and 
that’s a productive confusion, in a way, between voice as physical 
and voice as style of writing. People talk about “voice” as if that’s 
something you need to discover, and what that really means is devel-
oping a style that’s distinctive. So it has an interesting psychological 
power or value ascribed to it—and once you start to talk about using 
quotation or found material, this “voice” then becomes a collage or 
composite of all these different elements.
SS: I think voices always are. I was watching a PhD upgrade last 
week, and halfway through it struck me how much the student 
was speaking like their supervisor. Almost exactly the same, and I 
thought there’s so much aspiration that gets folded into your voice—
who you’d like to be like—because it’s an action, it’s not something 
you’re just passively emitting. 
Emotion
SS: One of the things I’m interested in is the way you express emo-
tion in your voice. Because your voice is a thing that you’re doing, 
it can express your emotion in a really unavoidable, physiological 
way. It’s much harder to keep a poker face with your voice—there’s 
no such thing actually. In the grips of strong emotion your body 
changes, and the fight or flight reaction can affect your voice: you 
get that wobbly terror sound that you can’t do anything about. Every 
so often you get someone being interviewed on live radio who’s got 
that wobble going on, and you can tell they’re terrified. 
And other things like laughter or crying go into direct conflict 
with your speaking—they’re actually using the same things. When 
you start getting spasms in your chest wall associated with crying 
and laughing, those are the same muscles you use to speak. 
And then there are the vocalizations you can produce quite invol-
untarily when you’re in an emotional state. When we were having 
a rodent episode at home, I thought a mouse had run across my 
foot—for no reason other than I knew there was a mouse somewhere 
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in the flat—in fact a hairgrip had fallen on my foot—and I properly 
screamed. And I thought, this is ridiculous, even if it were a mouse 
running across my foot, I’m not even scared, but the energy and ter-
ror in the house was so high, everyone was ready to go. Historically, 
there’s an argument that says sound is used throughout nature as a 
way of signalling alarm30—if you think about it, very few animals 
emit light as a way of communicating information because you can 
just rely on the fact that if there’s daylight stuff will just bounce off 
you and you can look brilliant with your iridescence or what have 
you—and actually the production of noise is associated with alarm 
calls across anything that’s animate. Because it can get around cor-
ners—it can work in the dark; it can work under forest canopies or in 
a burrow—you don’t need to see each other. So my screaming when 
something ran across my foot is going straight back to a very ancient 
evolutionary principle, that that’s a good way of indicating alarm. 
JW: And that presents a problem, both for scientists and for writ-
ers. Because it’s so obvious when someone is genuinely emotional: 
like you say, you hear it in the voice. And if you don’t hear it in the 
voice—I was thinking about the experiments you’ve done with so-
cial laughter, fake laughter, which people can identify instantly. The 
dominant emotion in any poetry reading is low-level anxiety, in the 
voice of the reader, so how would you create a sense of terror? I don’t 
think you could; I mean maybe you could train yourself, and that’s 
part of an actor’s training, but for people who simply perform their 
work it’s a problem. It’s not accessible to writing and re-performance, 
unless you terrify yourself or make yourself ecstatically happy. Those 
kinds of emotions are very difficult, and I know you’ve had similar 
difficulties ethically and practically.
SS: All of the work on the recognition and the perception of emo-
tions, all of that’s done with posed emotions. And Paul Ekman’s work 
on faces wasn’t even getting people to pull emotional expressions; 
he was just posing their muscles. 
Paul Ekman built on the work of people like Darwin who had predicted 
that some emotional states would be “basic” emotions, universal and 
common across mammals, with distinct expressions and neural bases 
for each emotion. Thus anger looks and sounds like anger in many dif-
ferent animals. Ekman developed a system for decoding and describing 
facial expressions, the Facial Affect Coding System, and his famous 
facial emotion stimuli are based on constellated positions of the fa-
30. Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth, How Monkeys See The World: Inside The 
Mind Of Another Species (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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cial musculature, rather than on people posing particular expressions 
of emotion.31
So he wasn’t saying, “Look scared”—he was saying, “Raise your eye-
brows.” And it’s a criticism I’ve always had: these emotions are all 
posed; why don’t you take things from films? And yet the problem 
I have as a scientist is that the sounds on films are not acoustically 
isolated. So after I started working with positive emotions,32 I started 
looking again at this, as it occurred to me that ethically we could get 
people to start really laughing in an authentic way, and compare this 
to posed laughter, and we don’t have to hurt anybody or frighten 
anybody or disgust anybody so much they make a noise. 
And we’ve found that there really are interesting differences 
between involuntary, spontaneous laughter and more posed, con-
trolled social laughter, though they are both used quite frequently 
across different kinds of interactions. Social laughter, for example, 
is not just a weak form of “real” laughter, but seems to have its own 
characteristics—for example, often being quite nasal. This work has 
allowed us to start to glimpse a lot more of the complexity of laugh-
ter in communication and interactions. And we’re now starting to 
ask similar questions about other emotions, such as sadness. In in-
fancy and childhood, crying is used in a highly controlled way to 
manage interactions, but this is much less common in adulthood—
how does this affect the ways that crying is perceived across different 
age ranges, for example?
JW: I think the historical dimension of that is fascinating too. I 
was just reading Sianne Ngai’s book about “ugly feelings,” which is 
precisely about those slightly ignoble passions, so not fear or rage or 
weeping, but paranoia, envy. 
While Ngai does deal with disgust—one of the so-called “basic” emo-
tions—in her afterword, she writes that although it is “the ugliest of 
‘ugly feelings,’” it is “an interesting exception” in that it is not liable 
to produce “the confusions between subject and object” like the other 
feelings she discusses.33 These feelings are all to do with frustrated 
31. Paul Ekman, E. Richard Sorenson, and Wallace V. Friesen, “Pan-Cultural Elements 
in Facial Displays of Emotion,” Science 164:3875 (1969): 86–88.
32. Disa Sauter and Sophie K. Scott, “More than One Kind of Happiness: Can We Rec-
ognize Vocal Expressions of Different Positive States?,” Motivation and Emotion 31:3 
(2007): 192–199.
33. Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 335.
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agency—a mode of being in the world that is particularly characteristic 
of what Ngai calls, in a formulation borrowed from Adorno, the “‘ad-
ministered world’ of late modernity.”34
Because I think one of the things about the crying is that surely it 
makes a demand on you—it makes a really strong demand. So people 
rated it as very visceral?
SS: We have found that if we present people with “real” versus 
posed crying (we had people really weeping in the anechoic cham-
ber to get these sounds), participants rated real crying as being very 
arousing, very visceral, but if you asked them, “Is that real crying, or 
is it posed?” they’ll say posed. Whereas they’re quite happy to say 
that real laughter is real laughter. Our participants may be flat out 
refusing to believe that we actually made people cry.
I’m painfully aware that when I talk about emotion I’m working 
in the area of the basic emotions, and it can be crude. The basic emo-
tions are fear, anger, surprise, sadness, disgust, and happiness—and 
happiness probably means laughter. And relief may well be another 
basic emotion, but things like pleasure, achievement, triumphant 
sounds—they are not. Although I think we are running into display 
rules around pleasure. I think people everywhere are very uncomfort-
able saying that any sound uttered by a man is a pleasure sound. So 
things like envy aren’t really addressed at all in that kind of context.
JW: And I think those are the kind of things where you’re not talk-
ing about the voice so much, but you are talking about the things 
that poetry, in its sense as a way to articulate thought through a pre-
cise combinations of sounds and words, can actually get at in quite 
a subtle way. You can write a poem that, if you like, embodies envy, 
much more easily than you can write a poem that embodies terror. 
Switching genres here, a horror story, or a ghost story, is horrify-
ing only to the extent that you project yourself into that imagina-
tive scenario. You don’t get scared by hearing a ghost story, you get 
scared by imagining it, don’t you?
If literature does provide a powerful mode through which to examine 
minor feelings, it might not only be for the prosodic reasons gestured 
at here through James’s talk of “precise combinations of sounds and 
words,” but for historical reasons too. To return briefly to Sianne Ngai, 
she suggests that literature is particularly apt for “theorizing social pow-
erlessness”—the kind of powerlessness at play in feelings like anxiety, 
34. Ibid., p.1.
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irritation or paranoia—because, like them, it results from a “situation 
of restricted agency” brought about by its formation as an autonomous, 
and therefore politically ineffectual, sphere of activity.35 
But as in our conversation, we would like to range beyond the confines 
of literary language, even if we cannot do more than sketch possibilities 
here. Denise Riley suggests that language as a whole is “radically his-
torical, and not as any secondary or superstructural effect—but imme-
diately so.”36 She asks if the “robust historicity” of language might not 
“also dwell in its emotionality, which lives in it, and which . . . is not 
something secondary or expressive of an inner thought sunk well below 
the linguistic skin.”37 This is an exciting, disturbing proposition: lan-
guage is not (or is not only) the emotional speaker’s expressive vehicle, 
but discharges its own affective, galvanic shocks; it is a fleshly thing for 
Riley, something she endows with skin and “musculature” in the form 
of syntax,38 and in a later work imagines to have “its life as internally 
as any other human tissue.”39
Acknowledgements 
James Wilkes’s poetry residency was supported by the Wellcome 
Trust [098203/Z/12/Z] and his writing of this article was supported 
by the Wellcome Trust Hub Award [103817/Z/14/Z]. Sophie Scott’s 
research is supported by the Wellcome Trust [WT090961MA]. Many 
thanks to Felicity Callard for her thoughts and to the anonymous 
reviewers for their comments. 
35. Ibid., p.2.
36. Denise Riley, The Words of Selves: Identification, Solidarity, Irony (Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 2000), p. 36.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 3.
39. Denise Riley, Impersonal Passion: Language as Affect (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2005), p. 7.
05_24.3 wilkes_331-350.indd   350 8/24/16   4:57 PM
